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Abstract
It is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance
with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory
alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incom-
patible with the virtue of intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that this is
a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectual humility involves.
Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is maintained that
non-conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are thus on much stronger
dialectical ground than many suppose, including some defenders of this line. In partic-
ular, non-conciliatory proposals can resist the idea that epistemic peer disagreement
directly weakens one’s epistemic justification, as conciliatory views maintain. This
means that the epistemic justification that our beliefs in this regard enjoy, and thus our
knowledge, is more secure than conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagree-
ment would suggest.
Keywords Epistemology of disagreement · Epistemology · Intellectual humility ·
Intellectual character
1 Introductory remarks
It is often suggested that there is an essential tension between taking a non-conciliatory
approach to epistemic peer disagreement and the requirements of good intellectual
character, especially in the sense of being suitably intellectually humble. According
to the non-conciliatory approach, there is no requirement, from an epistemic point
of view, to downgrade one’s epistemic assessment of the target proposition in the
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light of disagreement with an epistemic peer. Now imagine that you and I are both
(so we think anyway) roughly epistemic peers with regard to the subject matter in
play, who both regard ourselves as having knowledge of our respective beliefs, and
yet we surprisingly find ourselves disagreeing. If I stick to my opinion regardless,
then aren’t I inevitably displaying a worrying degree of epistemic arrogance, of a
kind that is incompatible with the requirements of a good intellectual character? In
particular, wouldn’t this apparently dogmatic stance demonstrate that I am failing to
exhibit the virtue of intellectual humility (an intellectual virtue that is widely thought
to be essential to having good intellectual character)?
We can re-cast this tension in terms of epistemic justification, and thereby in terms
of knowledge, at least to the extent that justification is at least necessary for knowl-
edge.1 Prior to the disagreement, as epistemic peers one is (roughly anyway) equally
justified in holding one’s belief as one’s counterpart is in holding her conflicting belief.
Conciliatory approaches to the epistemology of peer disagreement hold that discover-
ing the disagreement entails that one’s justification for one’s belief is at the very least
weakened by the fact of the epistemic peer disagreement (if one’s belief continues to
count as justified at all). This means that such disagreements thus have the potential
to undermine our knowledge. And we can regard this conciliatory approach as, in
significant part at least, motivated by the tension just set out between non-conciliatory
approaches to the epistemology of disagreement and the virtue of intellectual humility.
For if one regarded oneself as no less justified in holding one’s belief after discov-
ering the epistemic peer disagreement as one was before, then doesn’t that entail an
epistemic arrogance on one’s part, in that one is simply discounting the conflicting
testimony supplied by one’s epistemic peer?
I agree that this line of reasoning is very persuasive at first blush, but, as I hope to
show, I think that it should be resisted. A key part of understanding why this line of
reasoning is flawed is recognising that it is presupposing the wrong view of intellectual
humility. In particular, once we characterise intellectual humility correctly, then we
can account for how a subject can regard themselves as no less justified than they were
before the epistemic peer disagreement without this entailing that they lack intellectual
humility. This means that epistemic peer disagreement does not immediately weaken,
still less completely undermine, our justification. Relatedly, such disagreements are
not by their nature (at least potentially) knowledge-undermining either. Moreover,
I think that the problems that face a conciliatory stance as regards epistemic peer
disagreement have been given a far too easy ride precisely because there has been held
to be this supposedly overarching difficulty afflicting the non-conciliatory line.2 The
net effect of these points is that the non-conciliatory stance as regards epistemic peer
disagreement is on much stronger ground than many suppose, including those who
currently defend the view.
1 In what follows I will take it as given that knowledge entails justification.
2 What convinced me of this was an excellent talk by Stewart Cohen on the epistemology of disagreement
at the Eidyn research centre at the University in Edinburgh a few years ago. He began by setting out this
putative tension between non-conciliatory views and the demands of intellectual character and used this as
a rationale for the philosophical project of solving the difficulties that afflict conciliatory views. The point
was clear: this tension was meant to be toxic for non-conciliatory proposals, and hence the only game in
town was to try to make sense of conciliatory proposals.
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2 Unpacking the putative tension
Let’s start by setting out the putative tension between the non-conciliatory view and the
requirements of good intellectual character in more detail. Notice first how I formulated
the non-conciliatory view above, as the denial of a very weak version of the conciliatory
view, in order to bring the issue that concerns us into sharpest relief. One might think
that a conciliatory approach essentially involves epistemically requiring suspension
of belief in the face of epistemic peer disagreement, but that’s not my target. All that
counts on my version of the conciliatory view is that the epistemic peer disagreement
entails that one should lower one’s epistemic assessment of the target proposition. In
particular, one’s belief enjoys less justification than it did before, which means in turn
that it is less likely to amount to knowledge. Lowering one’s epistemic assessment
is consistent with one lowering it to the point of no longer believing it, and it is
also consistent with one lacking any justification for the target proposition after the
epistemic peer disagreement, but neither claim is entailed by the conciliatory view as
I am interpreting it.3
Accordingly, the non-conciliatory position on my reading demands that one is not
required, from an epistemic point of view, to lower one’s epistemic assessment of the
target proposition. That’s consistent with one in fact lowering this assessment, and also
with one lowering it to the extent that one no longer believes the target proposition,
but the point is just that there is no blanket epistemic requirement to do so simply as
a result of the epistemic peer disagreement. Similarly, there is no blanket requirement
to regard one’s belief as enjoying less justification as a result of the epistemic peer
disagreement, or to treat one’s belief as being less likely to amount to knowledge.4
There is one important feature of the non-conciliatory position that I want to flag,
since I think it is often overlooked. This is that it is entirely consistent with maintaining
this position that one also holds that when faced with an epistemic peer disagreement
one ought to be willing to reflect on the nature of one’s epistemic situation with regards
to the target proposition. Indeed, as I will explain below, I think that the requirements
of intellectual character demand this (and much more besides). Crucially, however,
reflecting on one’s epistemic situation in this regard does not entail downgrading one’s
epistemic assessment of the target proposition, and thus regarding one’s belief as less
justified, and hence less likely to be knowledge, than before. (But why then reflect at
all if your epistemic assessment of the target proposition is unaffected? We will come
back to this point).
I should also flag that I have a particular sub-class of epistemic peer disagreements
in mind (though as I will explain in a moment, I’m fairly confident most parties to this
debate has this sub-class in mind too). To begin with, like most people in this literature
I am specifically interested in cases of known epistemic peer disagreement (at least to
the extent that our hero is aware of the disagreement with her epistemic peer anyway).
3 For some prominent defences of (versions of) conciliationism, see Christensen (2007), Elga (2007) and
Feldman (2007).
4 This is part of the reason why I prefer calling the view in question ‘non-conciliatory’, as opposed to
some of the other names that are given to the position, such as the ‘steadfast’ view (e.g., Christensen 2009).
The latter, for example, seems to imply that one will stubbornly stick to one’s guns regardless, and hence
dialectically loads the die against the proposal from the off.
123
Synthese
In addition, I’m also specifically interested in epistemic peer disagreements where
one’s belief in the target proposition is considered. What I mean by this is that one
has put some thought into the reasons in favour of this proposition, or at least could
summon such reasons with ease if called upon to do so. This is important, because
many of our beliefs are not considered beliefs in this sense. We just have them, and
haven’t really thought about their rational basis (nor could we easily summon such a
rational basis if called upon to do so).
It’s vital to keep considered beliefs apart from non-considered beliefs for our pur-
poses because a non-conciliatory position, even granting the point just made about
reflection, would not be very plausible as regards non-considered belief. After all, in
such cases the epistemic peer disagreement is exposing the fact that one isn’t sure
what one’s rational basis for the target proposition is, and so when faced with such
disagreement it would usually be wise to downgrade one’s epistemic assessment of it
(if only temporarily), and thereby regard one’s belief as less justified than before (and
hence less likely to be knowledge), until this rational basis is clarified. So if we want to
evaluate a plausible form of the non-conciliatory position, we should focus on cases of
considered belief. (Interestingly, the stock examples of epistemic peer disagreemen-
t—such as calculated shares of the restaurant bill—nearly always involve what I’m
here calling considered belief, so one might reasonably think that this distinction is
already presupposed in the debate, but there’s no harm in making it explicit anyway).
On the notion of epistemic peerhood, I am going to offer a rather loose and inclusive
account, whereby it is sufficient that one regards one’s disputant as being roughly on
an epistemic par when it comes to the subject matter at hand. This means that one takes
one’s disputant to have roughly the same evidence as one does that’s relevant to this
dispute, is roughly equal in their cognitive capacities, and so on. Relatedly, prior to
the disagreement at least, one’s disputant is roughly as justified as you are in holding
their respective belief, and both parties takes themselves to have knowledge. Notice
that this doesn’t entail that the disputant likewise regards you as an epistemic peer—in
fact, she may think that she is one’s epistemic superior in this regard. Moreover, note
that this is a subjective account of epistemic peerhood, in that one could satisfy this
condition and one’s disputant not in fact be an epistemic peer.5
I have opted for this characterisation of epistemic peerhood because I think it is
this version that stands the best chance of generating the putative tension between
conciliatory views and the requirements of intellectual character. For example, we
want to capture the idea, central to the putative tension, that our hero is under an
epistemic requirement that they ought to be able to recognise from their point of
view. A subjective account of epistemic peerhood is clearly going to be the most
straightforward way of drawing this out.
Now we come to the requirements of intellectual character. I take good intellectual
character to be that which is manifested by agents who have a well-developed and
integrated set of intellectual virtues. We ought to have a good intellectual character,
and if we fall short in this regard, then that’s a failing on our part, at least from a purely
epistemic point of view.
5 For more on the notion of epistemic peerhood, see Kelly (2005), though note that his characterization is
not the same as the one just offered. See also Matheson (2015).
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There is a particular feature of good intellectual character that is doing the work
when it comes to the putative problem with non-conciliatory views that we are
focussing upon. This is the idea, now widely adopted, that intellectual humility is
an intellectual virtue, and hence a constituent part of one’s intellectual character. We
should note at this juncture that there is a minority view that intellectual humility isn’t
an intellectual virtue, but even if that’s so, it might still be a trait demanded of a good
intellectual character, in which case the putative tension between the non-conciliatory
position and a good intellectual character would still arise.6 In any case, we will grant
that intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue for the purposes of this paper, given
that it will only add strength to the opposition.
Keeping all the foregoing in mind, the general line of thought behind this putative
tension is that it would be a sign of an absence of intellectual humility, thereby rep-
resenting a failing of intellectual character, if one were to maintain one’s epistemic
assessment of the target proposition even in the face of epistemic peer disagreement.
In particular, maintaining that one is just as justified in one’s belief after the epis-
temic peer disagreement as before would represent a lack of intellectual humility.
And doesn’t that sound right? After all, given that we’ve granted that one regards
the other as roughly an epistemic peer, wouldn’t it be sheer intellectual arrogance
to maintain one’s epistemic assessment of the target proposition regardless (where
intellectual arrogance is obviously an indication that one lacks intellectual humility)?
In particular, isn’t to maintain one’s epistemic assessment of the target proposition in
these circumstances simply an expression of one’s brute dogmatic conviction that one
is entitled to one’s viewpoint, even though one’s epistemic peer disagrees? How can
this not be a manifestation of intellectual arrogance (and hence a lack of intellectual
humility)?7
3 Humility, intellectual or otherwise
I want to suggest that, contrary the line of argument just presented, the right account
of intellectual humility is entirely compatible with taking a non-conciliatory line on
epistemic peer disagreement. (Indeed, as we will note in due course, another account
of intellectual humility that is popular in the literature, but which I think is far less
plausible than the one defended here, might well be compatible with a non-conciliatory
line as well, albeit less obviously so. And a third account of intellectual humility might
not be amenable to setting up the putative tension in the first place). In order to see
this, we first need to consider humility more generally.
6 For a very intersting pushback on the idea of intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue, see Bloomfield
(2017a). See also Bloomfield (2017b).
7 This point is often put in terms of an epistemic symmetry claim. See, for example, Kelly (2005). Roughly,
the thought is that epistemic peerhood ensures that one is on an epistemic par (or at least should regard
one’s disputant as being on an epistemic par) with one’s disputant. Accordingly, on what rational basis can
one dismiss the opposing viewpoint? And if there is no rational basis for doing this, then surely that entails
that one is simply being dogmatic.
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There are three main ways of thinking about humility.8 According to the first
line—which I will call the ignorance proposal—humility involves having an inaccu-
rate conception of one’s achievements and abilities, one that treats them as significantly
more deficient than they in fact are. To be humble on this view is to have a downgraded
view of one’s achievements and abilities.9 This certainly seems to be closest to the folk
conception of humility, in that we tend to suppose that the genuinely humble don’t
merely behave as if they have a downgraded conception of their achievements and
abilities (which is compatible with this being a mere pretence), but that they really do
imagine that they are somehow ‘lesser’ than they in fact are.
According to the second line—what I will call the accuracy proposal—humility
involves having a correct assessment of the extent of one’s achievements and abilities,
albeit one that in the process involves recognising one’s inherent fallibility and limi-
tations. One needs to in a sense ‘own’ one’s limitations. Lack of humility, in contrast,
leads to one neglecting to recognise these inherent limitations and failings.
According to the third line—which I will call the non-egotist proposal—humility
involves lacking those characteristic dispositions involved in excessive self-regard,
such as conceit, arrogance, haughtiness, and so on. In contrast, on this view, humility
involves the essentially other-directed dispositions of, for example, helping others
behind the scenes without seeking the credit for doing so. This is in contrast to the
previous two proposals which are in effect self -regarding stances, in that they are
focussed on one’s own assessment of one’s achievements and abilities. Note that it
is important to the non-egotist proposal that these other-regarding dispositions arise
out of a genuine respect for others, and a love of the greater good more generally. For
example, superficially displaying the relevant dispositions for, say, merely strategic
reasons would not be a genuine manifestation of humility. In this the virtue of humility
is like other virtues (and unlike mere skills or faculties), in that its manifestation
involves characteristic dispositions that are rooted in appropriate motivational states.
These are three general approaches to humility, and hence within each approach we
could delineate more than one position that falls under this heading. What’s presently
important is just that for each of these three approaches we can determine a corre-
sponding proposal that is specifically focussed on intellectual humility.10 According
to the ignorance proposal, intellectual humility will involve having an inaccurate, in
the sense of degraded, conception of one’s intellectual achievements and cognitive
abilities. According to the accuracy proposal, intellectual humility will involve hav-
ing a correct assessment of one’s intellectual achievements and cognitive abilities,
8 I articulate this three-way characterization of humility, and thus of intellectual humility, in Kallestrup and
Pritchard (2017) and Pritchard (forthcoming a).
9 See especially Driver (1989). See also Brennan (2007) for a related proposal (though here it is not
inaccuracy as such but rather holding oneself to higher standards than one would ever hold others too).
10 Note that I am here following many others in the literature in taking it as given that intellectual humility
is a sub-species of humility more generally. I don’t myself find that claim controversial, but Paul Bloomfield
and Michael Lynch have independently put to me in conversation that they regard such an assumption as
controversial. (In Lynch’s case at least this is because he regards intellectual humility as a theoretical term
of art, which is used in ways that don’t altogether track our everyday conception of humility). If that were
right, then of course one ought not to move directly from an account of humility to an account of specifically
intellectual humility.
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and thereby recognising one’s inherent intellectual limitations.11 Finally, according to
the non-egotist proposal, intellectual humility will involve lacking the characteristic
dispositions involved in excessive intellectual self-regard, such as conceit, intellec-
tual arrogance, and so on. Relatedly, it will involve manifesting such dispositions as
an openness to other people’s viewpoints, a willingness to listen to counterevidence,
and the inclination to change one’s mind if the epistemic facts require it, where such
dispositions are rooted in appropriate motivational states (i.e., a genuine intellectual
respect for others, and a love of the intellectual good more generally).12,13
4 The putative tension, redux
I want to suggest that of these three general approaches to humility, and thus intellectual
humility, it is the non-egoist proposal that we should prefer. Crucially, however, this
way of thinking about intellectual humility will not generate the putative tension with
the non-conciliatory view about epistemic peer disagreement. (Indeed, as we will see,
arguably neither of the other two proposals will generate this tension either, at least
once the details are teased out, though this is not immediately obvious).
Interestingly, only the accuracy and non-egotist proposals are plausible contenders
when it comes to the issue that we are concerned with. This is because we have
granted to the opposition that intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue, as this
is an important part of the case that’s being made for the inherent tension between
non-conciliatory views and the demands of intellectual character. But it simply isn’t
credible that an intellectual virtue could be constituted in terms of an inaccurate
conception of oneself. Intellectual virtues, after all, are characterised by their epistemic
11 For two important developments of this type of account of intellectual humility in the recent literature, see
the doxastic proposal offered by Church (2016) and the limitations-owning proposal offered by Whitcomb
et al. (2017). Note, however, that there are important differences between these two proposals, though they
are not relevant for our current purposes. For a useful discussion of these differences, see Barrett and Church
(2016).
12 See Roberts and Wood (2003, 2007) for two important defences of this approach. See also Priest (2017)
and Tanesini (2016).
13 Note that on this proposal, intellectual humility will entail open-mindedness, a cognitive trait which
is itself often said to be an intellectual virtue. Indeed, one might be tempted as a result to treat these
two intellectual virtues as simply manifestations of a single general virtue. I think that this would be a
mistake, however, as one can be open-minded without thereby being intellectually humble. For example,
if one has heard the case for a certain opposing position before, then it is consistent with the demands
of open-mindedness that one dismisses it out of hand and declines to listen to it presented again. But
intellectual humility might well require one to listen, out of one’s intellectual respect for others. More
broadly, open-mindedness needn’t be rooted in the motivational state of intellectually respecting others
(and the truth more generally) as intellectual humility is, and hence one could exhibit the former without
thereby exhibiting the latter. Indeed, it isn’t clear to me that the dispositions associated with open-mindedness
need to be associated with virtuous motivational states at all. For sure, the open-minded person needs to care
about the truth, but I don’t see why this concern for the truth couldn’t be purely strategic—e.g., to further
one’s practical ends (scientific fame, for example)—in contrast to the virtuous motivational states behind
intellectual humility, which as we noted above could not be purely strategic in this way. (As we might
put the point, the intellectually virtuous person values the intellectual goods in a final, non-instrumental,
fashion). If that’s right, then intellectual humility and open-mindedness are bound to come apart, as only the
former is a genuine intellectual virtue. For two recent discussions of open-mindedness, see Riggs (2010)
and Baehr (2011).
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credentials, and an intellectual ‘virtue’ that essentially involved inaccuracy would
inevitably be lacking in epistemic pedigree.14 (Moreover, notice that on this view it
would appear to follow that having an accurate conception of one’s epistemic standing
would be an intellectual vice, which is a somewhat bizarre entailment of the position).
In any case, if intellectual humility is not a virtue, then it wouldn’t obviously have
anything essential to do with the demands of intellectual character, so there would be
a lacuna in the argument that there is an inherent tension between non-conciliatory
proposals and manifesting good intellectual character. So whatever else one might
say in opposition to the ignorance proposal for intellectual humility, it is out of the
running for our purposes, as it can’t be employed to create the putative tension between
non-conciliatory proposals regarding epistemic peer disagreement and the demands
of intellectual character.
With this in mind, it is important to note that if any of the remaining accounts of
intellectual humility is generating the putative tension between non-conciliatory views
about epistemic peer disagreement and the demands of intellectual character, then it is
the accuracy proposal (though the ignorance proposal would be a more dramatic way of
staging this tension). The problem is that if one sticks to one’s commitment to the target
proposition in the face of an epistemic peer disagreement, and hence regards one’s
belief as just as justified as before, then one is not, it seems, ‘owning’ one’s fallibility
at all, but rather ignoring it. One is thus lacking in the virtue of intellectual humility,
and that’s a failing of intellectual character. (As we will see below, there may be a
way of understanding the accuracy account such that it doesn’t have this consequence,
but if so, then all that would follow is that one can’t appeal to this account in order
to motivate the tension between non-conciliatory views and intellectual character that
concerns us).
In contrast, the non-egotist account of intellectual humility isn’t necessarily in
tension with a non-conciliatory position at all. What’s important to this account is
specifically the kinds of dispositions you manifest—whether you are open to changing
your opinions, whether you are willing to reflect on your evidence and the counterevi-
dence presented by others, whether you are respectful of other people’s views, and so
on—and whether those dispositions are rooted in the appropriate motivational states.
But one could well manifest all of these dispositions along with the relevant motiva-
tional statues and still be as committed to the target proposition as before. In particular,
one could manifest all these dispositions in the appropriate way while still regarding
one’s belief as no less justified than prior to the epistemic peer disagreement, and hence
no less likely to amount to knowledge. Moreover, in maintaining one’s commitment to
the target proposition in this fashion one wouldn’t be displaying intellectual arrogance
at all but rather intellectual humility, and hence one’s non-conciliatory stance would
not be in conflict with the demands of intellectual character.
Now one might object at this point that if one isn’t epistemically downgrading
one’s assessment of the target proposition, and thereby regarding one’s belief as less
justified than before the epistemic peer disagreement, then wouldn’t that make the
manifestation of these dispositions somewhat fake? I don’t think that this follows at
14 I’m sceptical of any bona fide virtue being manifested by inaccurate dispositions, and thus with the idea
of humility in general being a virtue in this sense, but that’s not an issue that we need concern ourselves
with just now.
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all. This is a good juncture to return to a point I made earlier when I said that it is entirely
consistent with a non-conciliatory view that one ought to reflect on the nature of one’s
evidence in response to an epistemic peer disagreement. Now one might be puzzled
by this because one holds that if one is not downgrading one’s epistemic assessment of
the target proposition in light of the disagreement—even temporarily—then any such
reflection is just a fake show. We thus have a parallel concern to the one just noted,
albeit now specifically focussed on the subject’s reflection on their epistemic position
while maintaining their view. Again, however, I think the worry is unfounded, and I
think that the non-egotist account of intellectual humility accurately captures why.
In being willing to reflect on one’s evidence in light of the epistemic peer dis-
agreement, one is manifesting one’s good intellectual character, and one’s intellectual
humility in particular. Moreover, if this reflection is rooted in a good intellectual char-
acter, and thus arises out of the distinctive motivational states that are constitutive
of such a character (i.e., a love for the truth), then there will be nothing fake at all
about this process of refection. Indeed, it could well result in one realising that there
is something amiss with the evidence one has for the target proposition which one
has hitherto overlooked, in which case as an intellectually virtuous subject one will
be willing to revise one’s epistemic assessment of this proposition accordingly, and
thereby regard oneself as less justified in believing the target proposition than before
the epistemic peer disagreement, and hence less likely to have knowledge.15
I noted earlier that I thought good intellectual character not only demands that one
reflects on one’s evidence in light of epistemic peer disagreement, but much also else
besides. We can see why by considering what someone with the virtue of intellectually
humility would do in response to an epistemic peer disagreement, at least on the non-
egotist proposal. For besides reflecting on the nature of their evidence, she will also
manifest a range of other distinctive behaviours, such as considering the other person’s
reasons for thinking otherwise, being willing to respectively discuss the issue further,
and all the time showing a willingness to change her mind if that is demanded by the
evidence. Crucially, however, one can manifest all of these behaviours—along with the
corresponding motivational states—while nonetheless maintaining one’s conviction
in the target proposition, and hence regarding oneself as no less justified in one’s
belief than before the epistemic peer disagreement. And since these behaviours are
arising out of appropriate motivational states for an intellectual virtue, there is nothing
remotely fake about responding in this way.
We have seen that of the three main ways of thinking about intellectual humil-
ity, only one of them—the accuracy approach—generates even a prima facie basis for
thinking that there is an essential tension between non-conciliatory views and intellec-
tual humility. Moreover, there is one way of thinking about intellectual humility—the
non-egotist approach—such that there need be no essential tension of this kind at all.
Still, one might argue that this is beside the point because it is the accuracy account
of intellectual humility that creates this tension that is the correct position to hold.
With this in mind, let me explain why I think the non-egotist account of intellectual
humility is to be preferred over the accuracy account.
15 Going back to an earlier point—see endnote 4—this is why, by the way, it is important to call the view
‘non-conciliatory’ rather than ‘steadfast’.
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There are two scenarios that we should consider. In the most straightforward case
we imagine someone who has an accurate conception of her (ordinary) cognitive
achievements and abilities, but who is nonetheless lacking in the distinctive other-
regarding dispositions and motivational states as set out by the non-egotist account.
This is entirely possible, after all. Perhaps she fully recognises her limitations, but is
nonetheless dismissive of others regardless, and hence acts in an intellectually arrogant
way. And of course being intellectual arrogant is incompatible with being intellectually
humble. The point is that while normally recognising one’s epistemic limitations leads
to certain distinctively humble other-regarding dispositions, it doesn’t have to.
We can bring this point into sharper relief by imagining a second case where the
subject is not an ordinary individual from an epistemic point of view, but rather intel-
lectually exceptional. This person might well recognise her inherent fallibility, but
at the same time also recognise that she is far less fallible than most of the ordinary
folk. On the accuracy view, what would prevent her from being quite explicit about
her epistemic superiority over those around her, and hence being dismissive of their
opinions as a result? After all, that would be entirely compatible with embracing her
fallibility, given that her intellectual superiority means that she is far less fallible than
those around her. The crux of the matter is that in this scenario ‘owning one’s limita-
tions’ could be entirely compatible with being dismissive of others and hence being
intellectually arrogant—she is intellectually superior, after all.
Now one response that someone who defends the accuracy view might offer to
such cases is to insist that genuinely ‘owning’ one’s intellectual limitations entails
exhibiting the other-regarding dispositions set out by the non-egotist proposal, such
that the two scenarios just described would not be bona fide cases of ‘owning’ one’s
fallibility.16 I really don’t see why this should be the case—especially when it comes
to someone who is genuinely intellectually superior and fully recognises this fact—but
we do not need to argue the point for our purposes. This is because if this is the way we
are to understand the view, then, at least in terms of the putative tension between non-
conciliatory views and the demands of intellectual character, there is no substantive
difference between this account of intellectual humility and the non-egotist proposal.
Accordingly, if the non-egotist account of intellectual humility doesn’t generate this
tension, then neither will the accuracy account on this reading. So, again, the case for
this putative tension collapses.
Interestingly, once we notice that the accuracy account—insofar as it is significantly
distinct from the non-egotist account anyway—is compatible with failing to display
the characteristic dispositions and motivational states of the intellectual humble, then
we also realise that it doesn’t necessarily generate an essential tension with non-
conciliatory views either. It seemed to above because we were taking it as given
16 This does indeed seem to be roughly the way this proposal is understood by Whitcomb et al. (2017).
What complicates the matter, however, is that Whitcomb et al. effectively mischaracterize what I am here
called the non-egotist position as the claim that one should be disposed to have a “low concern for one’s own
intellectual status and entitlements.” (6) But this is at most a consequence of the view, rather than being the
view itself. Indeed, given that this way of characterizing the position is so ego-centric, it is arguably not even
that. The nub of the matter is that Whitcomb et al. misidentify what is key to the non-egotist position, which
is the way in which it is grounded in an intellectual concern for others and for the truth more generally.
Accordingly, it is far from clear that their presentation of (what I am here calling) the accuracy view really
does fully capture the kinds of cases that drive the non-egotist view.
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that having an accurate conception of one’s epistemic capacities meant being willing
to automatically downgrade one’s epistemic assessment of the target proposition in
light of an epistemic peer disagreement, and thereby regard one’s belief in the target
proposition as less justified (and hence less likely to be knowledge) as a result. But since
one can satisfy the requirements of the accuracy account even while being dismissive
of others and hence intellectually arrogant (as in the case where one fully recognises
that one is intellectually superior to those around one), then obviously this entailment
doesn’t follow at all. (Of course, we have seen that not downgrading one’s epistemic
assessment of the target proposition in light of an epistemic peer disagreement is
also compatible with being intellectually humble). So the putative tension between
non-conciliatory views and the demands of intellectual character are unravelling even
granting that we opt for the problematic accuracy account of intellectual humility.
Finally, notice that having an accurate conception of one’s epistemic standing isn’t
necessary for one to manifest intellectual humility anyway. Perhaps one is inclined
to underestimate one’s epistemic standing. Would that preclude one from manifest-
ing intellectual humility? I don’t see why. The crucial thing is whether one manifests
the distinctive behaviours and corresponding motivational states described by the non-
egotist proposal, behaviours and motivational states that one could manifest regardless
of whether one’s epistemic assessment of oneself is accurate. Having an accurate con-
ception of one’s epistemic standing—or, for that matter, an inaccurate one—is not an
essential requirement for one to manifest intellectual humility. What is important is
displaying those distinctive behaviours and corresponding motivational states associ-
ated with being intellectually humble.
5 The state of play
So where does this leave us in terms of the state of play regarding the conciliatory/non-
conciliatory debate about the epistemology of peer disagreement? My sense is that
even most defenders of non-conciliatory approaches are inclined to accept that there
is at least a prima facie tension between their view and the requirements of intellectual
character, and hence that the non-conciliatory stance is on the back foot from the off.
Accordingly, if I’m right and there is in fact no tension of this kind, then it follows
that non-conciliatory views are on a much stronger footing, even by the lights of some
of their defenders. Relatedly, my suspicion is that a lot of commentators feel pulled
towards a conciliatory position with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement
precisely because they think that the problems that afflict the non-conciliatory pro-
posal—such as the putative tension with the demands of intellectual character that we
have discussed—are fatal to view. If the position can deal with these putative prob-
lems, as I have argued, then this dramatically changes the dialectical landscape, in
that non-conciliatory stances with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement
are now viable.17
17 See also Pritchard (2012), where I defend non-conciliatory proposals from so-called ‘track-record’
objections, as pressed, for example, by Elga (2007).
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Moreover, the problems facing conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagree-
ment are now brought into sharper relief. After all, this is not a cost-free proposal in
that it brings with it difficulties of its own, difficulties that are often glossed over given
that it is taken as granted that the alternative non-conciliatory stance is in a worse
dialectical position. These include, for example, the notorious problem that the pro-
ponent of a conciliationary approach should be willing to downgrade her confidence
in the conciliatory proposal itself, given that this is philosophically controversial.18
The difficulties facing conciliatory approaches have been thought to be of a kind that
should be borne precisely because the problems that face non-conciliatory approaches
have been treated as so severe. If it turns out that that the non-conciliatory approach
to epistemic peer disagreement is on much stronger ground than many supposed—in-
cluding proponents of the position—then the difficulties that afflict the conciliatory
approach suddenly take on a new aspect. The upshot is that when it comes to epistemic
peer disagreement, there is much less of a challenge to the justification of our beliefs,
and thus our knowledge, than many have hitherto supposed.19,20
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